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Summary 
 
 
Toward a 22nd-Century World Philosophy: 
Philosophy as a Program 
Hideo KAWAMOTO 
 
Philosophy today is in a sort of quandary because reality itself is undergoing a broad process of 
continual change with the advent of virtual reality and artificial reality. At this juncture, fixed reality 
has already been lost, and a continually changing reality has become the principal subject of 
philosophy. The framework of philosophy that has been formulated to respond to this situation is 
“transcendental empiricism.” This framework continues from Schelling, Bergson, and Deleuze while 
creating a link with autopoietic systems. It overturns truth, goodness, and beauty, which belong to 
the realm of traditional philosophy, and places them in the reverse sequence of production, persistent 
action, and genuine fact. 
 
 
Time, the Present, and Potentiality in Aristotle 
 
Kazuya MATSUURA 
 
Aristotle is one of the pioneers of the philosophy of time. But his argumentation on time in book IV in 
Physics does not seem to consider seriously some essential characteristics of time, namely, the past 
and the future, the present, eternity, modality, the flow of time. This essay aims to clarify these ideas 
by focusing on his concepts of “the now” (τὸ νῦν) and asking whether the present exists actually or 
not. Interpreting the claim offered in book IV 13 of Physics that the present divides the past and the 
future potentially, this essay provides that the present does not exist in time in the same manner as 
that a point exists in a line, and Aristotle never offers the idea of time solely based on from geometric 
concepts. 
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Philosophizing in Clinical Practice: 
From “Patient-Centered” to “Loving Struggle” 
Dai IWASAKI 
 
The medical professional–patient relationship in contemporary medicine is characterized by the 
“patient-centered approach,” which locates the criteria for decision-making in the patient, based on 
the principle of “respect for autonomy” that protects patient rights while prioritizing the patient’s 
treatment. When necessary, a multidisciplinary team engages in close communication with each 
other to provide the best possible service in light of a holistic understanding of the patient. 
However, the suffering related to life and death that envelops patients at the end of life concerns 
the primordial limitations of humanity, and it is a philosophical and religious issue that transcends 
the medical framework. Using the concept of “boundary situations,” Jaspers regards this suffering 
and despair as an opportunity to transcend objective, rational, and practical worldviews and attain 
the realm of subjective Existenz. He believes that achieving a subjective attitude that overcomes 
despair requires open and equal communication between people who have experienced equivalent 
boundary situations themselves, and calls this relationship “Loving Struggle.” 
In the patient-centered approach, not causing distress to the patient in the course of clinical practice 
and respecting the patient’s decision-making are emphasized, but Jaspers argues that it is “loving 
struggle,” that is, a willingness to cause the other suffering, rather than compromise or concern, 
which may ultimately improve the patient’s QOL (quality of life) and of those around him or her. 
Based on this conflict, a number of possibilities for philosophizing in contemporary clinical practice 
are presented. 
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On Goethe’s Imagination and Kant’s Intuitive Understanding 
 
Kazunari HATA 
 
The first emergence of a rough thought or a loose inspiration in science does not always have to be 
logical and theoretically clear. The gravitational force at a distance without an agent, the theory of 
evolution through natural selection, the transference in psychotherapy or other scientific terms are—
at the beginning of their research—always present as only vague and still puzzling ideas. This 
ambiguity of scientific concepts is not simply based on a lack of understanding, but on the natural 
process of imagination. Although the involvement of the imagination is removed as an illegitimate 
element in the finished research due to the logical refinement of the theory, imagination plays an 
important role in the initial phase of the development of any theory of science. The theory as such 
then appears logical and rational, because it is followed as a doctrine that has already proved to be 
true. With a Goethean expression, this can be described as the “dead nature” in which the nascent 
power, which the inventor of the theory experienced when beginning to deal with a problem, has 
already died or is at least hidden in it. Goethe tries to represent this power not only in art but also in 
scientific theory. In my treatise, I consider the relationship between Goethe's concept of natural 
science and art and Kant's epistemology to clarify Goethe's methodology of natural science through 
focusing on the “archetypal phenomenon.” 
 
 
Reconsidering “the Origin of Geometry” 
To advance a research program in Husserl's phenomenology 
Satoshi INAGAKI 
 
Phenomenologist Husserl’s essay, The Origin of Geometry, which he wrote in the last years of his life, 
has influenced many philosophers. Husserl envisaged the origin of geometry as occurring in the 
interactions between human action and technology in the “pre-geometric culture” before Galileo 
Galilei. To prove this, however, will require eliminating both the longing toward nature and the bias 
against technology present in phenomenology as a philosophical standpoint and providing 
archeological evidence not limited to philosophers’ texts. This paper lays the groundwork for 
developing such a phenomenological program. 
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The critique of “new realism” and the idea of Husserl’s 
intercultural phenomenology 
 
Ichiro YAMAGUCHI 
 
The present paper focuses on the “critique of correlationism” of “new realism,” which has been 
frequently discussed recently as a new trend in modern philosophy. The paper aims to provide a 
clearer understanding of Husserl’s philosophy of cultural phenomenology by clarifying what this 
criticism means for the compositional analysis of Husserl’s “noesis-noema” correlation. This paper 
also considers I. Römer’s “critique of new realism” and endeavors to depict the direction of 
intercultural phenomenology through an examination of Kant’s concept of “reality” and a 
comparative examination of the temporal stipulation in the schematic theory of transcendental 
imagination and the intentional analysis of Husserl’s temporal consciousness. 
 
 
Why should the Universe be Pluralistic?:  
Conferring to the Truth Theory of Pragmatism 
Takashi OKINAGA 
 
William James has proposed, from his own pragmatic point of view, that truth is ultimately 
determined by our “temperments.” However, some scholars may criticize this proposition as being 
too voluntaristic. To address this concern, we must prove that our fundamental worldviews are 
established resting on their respective metaphysical truths, and that each truth has its ontological 
dimension at the root of itself. And we can no longer judge which truth is actually true through our 
positive knowledge.     
It is true that we cannot prove the existence of that dimension in James’ work clearly. Therefore, in 
this paper, we first work from the assumption that the choice of metaphysical truth through our will 
becomes serious and decisive only after the ontological necessity of that dimension is confirmed.  
Second, we prove that the dimension of such a metaphysical judgment also exists in today’s 
“philosophy of mind” or “philosophy of biology.” Furthermore, we confirm that this dimension of 
judgment also forms the foundation of our knowledge in general and that the dimension is not a 
positive datum itself, but a foundation situated as a horizon on which we can deal with such positive 
data and make them work meaningfully. 
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Philological Study of the *Buddhānusmṛtivṛtti and the 
*Buddhānusmṛtiṭīkā (2): 
Comparing with the Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana 
Toshio HORIUCHI 
 
This article constitutes one of a series presenting a critical edition of the Tibetan text and Japanese 
translation of the *Buddhānusmṛtivṛtti ascribed to Asaṅga and the *Buddhānusmṛtiṭīkā ascribed to 
Vasubandhu, and is a continuance of my previous article. I attempted to read these two texts that 
survive only as Tibetan translations assuming the underlying original Sanskrit. In this article I dealt 
with the interpretation of vidyācaraṇasampanna (perfected in wisdom and practice) among the ten 
epithets of tathāgata. I found that Jñānagarbha’s Ārya-anantamukhanirhāradhāraṇīṭīkā includes a 
closely related argument with the above two texts concerning the interpretation of the ten epithets. I 
also argued that the two texts are later than Vasubandhu’s Vyākhyāyukti and Guṇamati’s 
Vyākhyāyuktiṭīkā and were not written by Asaṅga or Vasubandhu. 
 
 
A Dispute on the Phrase “Thus Have I Heard” and the First 
Recitator (saṃgītikāra): 
Critical Edition of Tibetan Text and Annotated Japanese Translation of 
the Corresponding Passages in Atiśa’s Commentary on the Heart 
Sutra and Jñānavajra’s Commentary on the Laṅkāvatārasūtra 
Toshio HORIUCHI 
 
As previous studies have pointed out, with regard to the authority of the “[first] recitator” 
(saṃgītikāra) of Buddhist scriptures, Vimalamitra, in his commentary (PHT) on the Heart Sutra (HS), 
criticized the opinion of Dignāga as expressed in the Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthasaṃgraha. Atiśa’s 
commentary on the HS, which is a kind of a sub-commentary on Vimalamitra’s PHT, expands the 
argument supporting Vilamamitra. I recently found that Jñānavajra’s commentary (Jv) on the 
Laṅkāvatārasūtra, on the other hand, criticized Vimalamitra, supporting Dignāga. In this paper I will 
present a critical edition of the Tibetan text and annotated Japanese translation of the corresponding 
passages in Atiśa and Jv’s texts which deal with the authority of the recitator, the question of who the 
resitator is, and the meaning of the phrase “evaṃ mayā śrutam (thus have I heard).” 
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Annotated Translation of Nishi Amane’s Seisei Sakki (3) 
 
Takafumi HARIMOTO 
 
This is an annotated translation of Seisei Sakki, written by Nishi Amane in 1884. Seisei Sakki indicates 
Nishi Amane’s attempt to understand Western philosophical thinking, which was not present in Japan 
at the time, based on Confucian knowledge. In this sense, this book is interested. 
Following the previous paper, this one also covers Nishi Amane’s increasing depth of 
understanding regarding the concept of “consciousness” ( 意 識 ). Nishi Amane argues that the 
“consciousness” in this paper occupies a pivotal position in Eastern and Western morality, presents 
“conscience” in English, and “sincerity” (seii 誠意) and “self-knowledge” (dokuchi 独知) in Confucian 
Great Learning. Here, Nishi’s understanding of “consciousness,” based on Chinese philosophical and 
Buddhist understanding, is presented. 
 
 
Responsibility for Ignorance and Responsibility for Actions 
Due to Ignorance 
 
Masako OTA 
 
Gideon Rosen proposed the “skeptical argument” that it is unknown whether or not a culpable act 
conducted out of ignorance is immediately regarded as culpable. This argument is distinctive as it 
does not state whether an ignorant act is culpable or not, but the consequence that a bad act may 
potentially be absolved from culpability even if it was committed in ignorance is highly controversial. 
In this paper, I focus on the crux of Rosen’s argument of “culpable actions or negligence in the causal 
history of an act” and show that these do not necessarily generate skepticism as to whether or not 
culpable ignorance is possible and that this can be applied to the attribution of culpability of acts 
committed in ignorance by focusing on the “attributes” of the actor. Additionally, through a 
comparison with “self-deception,” which has similar characteristics to “akrasia,” I will show that 
akrasia, which has a more limited nature than “weakness of the will” as generally understood, cannot 
lead to the indeterminacy of culpability as indicated by Rosen. 
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The Reality and Formality of Bergsonian Intuition 
 
Akio KIYOZUKA 
 
To interpret Bergson’s concept of intuition, which is defined as a correspondence between “the act of 
knowing” and “the act of generating reality” in his Creative Evolution, we must refer to Bergson’s view 
of reality. As Deleuze pointed out, it is certain that when Bergson discusses “the natural articulations 
of the real,” he assumes that the articulations of the real gradually become clear through actualization 
of virtual multiplicity. However, such nature of the real seems to reflect Bergson’s rather bizarre view 
on the form/matter distinction that the compatibility between form and matter, which is supposed to 
be revealed a posteriori, is presupposed by the immanence of form and matter. The life “informs the 
material.” The form that is grasped through intuition is a form of life that emerges from matter as 
being compatible with it. The form of life that is compatible with this matter appears only after 
intuition acquires self-consciousness. Here arises the correspondence between “the act of knowing” 
and “the act of generating reality.” 
 
 
